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CIDCAGO HOPE MEETS THE
CIDCAGO SCHOOL

Gail B. Agrawal*
MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND
OF RATIONING MECH ANISMS . By Mark A. Hall. New
York: Oxford University Press. 1997. Pp. xii, 300. $35.

ECONOMICS

Twenty-five years after the enactment of the Federal Health
Maintenance Organization Act1 and nearly five years after the fail
ure of proposed federal health care reform, managed care2 has
come to dominate the medical marketplace. As a result, the rela
tionships among patients, payers, and physicians have changed fun
damentally and dramatically. In this market-driven environment,
health care - how much it costs, who receives treatment, and who
pays for it - may have surpassed the weather as a topic of every
day conversation at dinner tables and water coolers across the
country. In the popular press, reports concerning managed care,
usually derogatory, are surpassed in number only by news of the
latest political scandals.3 Scholars, too, find health care a rich topic
for discussion.4
Prof essor Mark Hall's5 new book, Making Medical Spending

Decisions: The Law, Ethics, and Economics of Rationing Mecha
nisms, is the culmination of many years of his work6 on the "funda* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina Law School. B.A. 1978,
University of New Orleans; J.D. 1983, M.P.H. 1983, Tulane. - Ed. I would like to thank
Professors Lissa Broome, Caroline Brown, David Hyman, Peter Jacobson, Melissa Saunders,
Susan Scheutzow, and Larry Zelenak for their helpful comments on previous drafts. I would
also like to thank Kimberly Beach for her research assistance. Fmally, I owe a special debt to
Professor Yale Kamisar for urging me to write this book review.

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1994); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.100-.180 (1997).
2. The term "managed care" refers to a variety of health benefit designs that combine the
financing and delivery of health care services and provide for the exercise of controls over
both functions.

3. For an empirical study of media coverage of managed care, see Mollyann Brodie et al.,
Media Coverage of Managed Care: ls There a Negative Bias?, HEALTH A.FF., Jan.-Feb. 1998,
at 9.
4. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? (1996) (reviewed in this issue by Thomas Greaney, How Many Libertarians Does it
Take to Fix the Health Care System?, 96 MicH. L. REv. 1825 (19Q8).
5. Mark Hall is a Professor of Law and Public Health at Wake Forest University and
Bowman Gray School of Medicine.

6. See Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1994);
Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 1637 (1992).
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mental question" (p. 8) of who should make cost-based rationing
decisions for health care services. Proceeding from the generally,
although not universally,7 accepted premise that rationing of health
care resources is inevitable, Professor Hall begins his analysis con
sidering the role of three categories of potential decisionmakers for
medical spending dec��ions:8 consumers of health care services,
third parties external to the. patient-physician relationship,9 and
physicians at the bedside.1 0
After concluding that neither consumers nor any of the third
parties are ideally suited for all types of medical spending decisions,
Professor Hall turns to the role of the attending physician at the
bedsides of individual patients.11 Bringing together legal, political,
economic, and philosophical thinking on the role of cost in clinical
decisionmaking in the current market-based health care delivery
system,12 he ably establishes his thesis that a physician may in some
circumstances and to some degree make cost-conscious clinical de
cisions at the bedside.
Professor Hall then turns to the next logical step in the analysis:
the circumstances under which physicians may act as rationing
agents to withhold "marginally beneficial" care (p. 118). Here, he
relies extensively on conclusions he draws from a consumer's deci
sion to obtain health care coverage through a limited insurance
plan. A consumer's selection of a health plan benefit design dic
tates the allocation of spending authority for that consumer.13 The
collective decisions of consumers about insurance coverage operate
as market mechanisms to select the "best mix" of medical deci
sionmakers (p. 246). Under Professor Hall's theory of economic
informed consent,14 HMO enrollees, if properly informed of the
7. See Arnold S. Relman,
{1990).

Is Rationing Inevitable?, 322 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 1809, 1810

8. In this book, Professor Hall uses the terms "medical spending decision," "rationing,"
and "allocation" interchangeably to mean the "implicit or explicit denial of marginally bene
ficial medical treatment out of consideration for its cost." P. 6.
9. Included in this category are insurers, government officials, and other centralized au
thorities. See discussion infra at section I.A.
10. I use the term "bedside" to include any clinical encounter between a physician and a
patient, whether in � inpatient, outpatient, or office setting.
11.

See discussion infra at section I.B.

12. No book review could describe completely Professor Hall's detailed and nuanced ar
guments. From the political viewpoint, he considers how each potential decisionmaker fares
in current realities. His ethical analysis applies communitarianism, liberalism, and social con
tract theory, as well as professional ethics and bioethics. His legal analysis considers the
doctrine of informed consent, case law, and legislative and regulation initiatives affecting
health maintenance organizations and their physicians.
13. I use the terms "health plan benefit design" or "benefit design" to include both in
sured and self-insured plans and traditional indemnity as well as the myriad of managed care
products.
14. See also Mark A. Hall, A
(1997).

Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31

GA. L. REv. 511
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economic underpinnings of that form of coverage, are deemed
either to consent, or to waive their right to give informed consent,
to their physicians' cost-based clinical decisions to withhold some
beneficial medical care (p. 211).
Although I disagree that insurance selection fulfills all the pur
poses assigned to it in this book,15 this is a self-contained limitation
that warrants further thought, and not a fatal flaw in a sound analy
sis. In the final paragraph of this work, Professor Hall state's that
his "objective [in writing this book] will be met if the reader is con
vinced to avoid the attraction of absolutist taboos and simplistic
sounding solutions and instead is motivated to give this intractable
problem hard thought" (p. 262). After reading Professor Hall's co
gent analysis of this critical issue, the reader is unlikely to find any
arguments left for the proposition that physicians must be entirely
"cost blind" in their clinical decisionmaking. Professor Hall has
thus taken an important step toward resolving the problem of allo
cating health care resources.
Yet the book also leaves me wanting more. While ably pointing
out the weak underpinnings of an absolute prohibition on cost con
sideration, the discussion offers little positive analytical support in
favor of physician bedside rationing. The book acknowledges the
need for (p. 155), but does not provide, practical guidance on how
the physician is to assume this new role as society's rationing agent
at the bedside of individual patients or on what will replace the
former ethical dictate that the physician be committed solely to the
patient's medical well-being.16 Combining the physician's role as
rationing agent with the proposed theory of economic informed
consent for HJvf0 enrollees has profound implications for the rela
tionship between patient and physician. But these issues, too, go
largely unexplored. In short, I wish that Professor Hall's book of
fered more to facilitate the translation of sound scholarly sugges
tion into practical health care reform. One book, however, cannot
answer all questions. The desire for more should be seen as a trib
ute to the success of this work in convincing the reader of its basic
premise that physicians are not bound to ignore cost in clinical
decisionmaking.
With some trepidation, I accept Professor Hall's invitation to
give this difficult problem "hard thought" and will add to Professor
Hall's self-styled "analytical musings of an academic lawyer" (p.
261) the musings of a long-time practicing health care lawyer and
15.

See infra text accompanying notes 70-88.

16. In an article published as this book review was going to press, Professor Hall begins
to develop ethical guidance for physicians as medical-spending decisionmakers. See Mark A.
Hall & Robert Berenson, Ethical Practice in Managed Care: A Dose of Realism, 128 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 395, 399 (1998).
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student of the health care delivery system who has recently entered
the legal academy.17 Before I comment further on our areas of dis
agreement or on what Professor Hall does not address, I will de
scribe the wealth of ideas and insights he shares with us in this
book.
I. WHO SHALL DECIDE?18
A. Patients, Payers, and Third Parties
Chapters Two and Three are devoted to a discussion of potential
nonphysician decisionmakers and their medical spending decisions.
The analysis begins with the intuitively most obvious choice, the
consumer-patient. Covering now-familiar territory, Professor Hall
points out that in a perfectly functioning market for health care
services, consumers making discrete decisions about their own med
ical care would lead to the optimal allocation of medical resources
(pp.20-22). Of course, observers of the health care delivery system
have long known that the market for health care services is not per
fect. Regulatory interventions such as mandated benefits and com
prehensive health care insurance shield health care consumers from
the actual costs of their decisions. Since health care insurance is
itself subsidized through taxation, consumers who obtain health
coverage through employer-based plans are likewise shielded from
the full cost of their insurance choices. The advent of managed care
has exacerbated consumers' insensitivity to the cost of care by elim
inating the patient's financial responsibility for deductibles and co
insurance and requiring in their stead only modest copayments.19
Although some economists anc\ policy analysts have argued that
the market for health care services would properly allocate medical
resources if consumers' price sensitivity could be enhanced through
insurance reform, 2° Professor Hall explains that consumers will still
not be ideal decisionmakers (pp. 23-34). First, even cost-sensitive
consumers will not be ideal decisionmakers because when the more
17. Before I began teaching law full time, I
firm in New Orleans, Louisiana, and later as a

practiced health law as a member of a law
senior-level in-house counsel with a major
health insurer. During my career as a practicing lawyer, I represented integrated delivery
systems, physician group practices, individual physicians, health care trade associations, and
hospitals, as well as health maintenance organizations and other payers. I also lobbied on
behalf of my clients in favor of and against state and federal legislative proposals affecting
managed care organizations and health care providers, including so-called anti-managed care
legislation. Although as a practicing lawyer I had access to materials of the type referenced
in this book review, all of the sources cited here were obtained from public sources.

18. With apologies to VICTOR FuCFis, WHO SHALL LIVE? {1974).
19. See Bruce C. V ladeck, From the Health Care Financing Administration: Managed
Care and Quality, 273 JAMA 1483 {1995). The paradox of managed care is that it enhances
consumer demand for care by lowering cost barriers :while simultaneously seeking to restrict
access to care, or more precisely access to care at the managed care organization's expense.

20. See, e.g., CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH EcoNOMICS 199-200 {1992).

May 1998]

Medical Rationing

1797

costly purchasing decisions must be made, patients are ill and, as a
result, not well-suited or personally inclined to make cost-conscious
medical decisions. Second, patients are uninformed deci
sionmakers, as they generally lack technical medical knowledge.21
Finally, putting a patient in a bargaining relationship with her physi
cian about the cost of care is not conducive to the documented heal
ing effects of the trust-based patient-physician relationship.22
Having concluded that the seemingly obvious choice for making
medical spending decisions is not always the optimal choice, Profes
sor Hall turns to third parties external to the patient-physician rela
tionship as potential medical spending decisionmakers. He divides
these third parties into three categories: the "bureaucrats," the
"technocrats," and the "democrats" (pp. 64, 73, 91). The category
of bureaucrats includes those who are·currently the decisionmakers
in many instances: insurers, government regulators, and judges (pp.
64-73). Technocrats are yet-nonexistent panels of disinterested
scientists and physicians armed with yet-to-be-developed compre
hensive medical outcome measures and clinical protocols tied to hy
pothetical insurance contract language.23 Democrats are another
largely hypothetical category of representative citizen groups (pp.
91-99). Each category has its limitations as potential deci
sionmakers for medical spending decisions.
Professor Hall posits that insurers and regulators are reluctant
decisionmakers (pp. 64-67). I might be inclined to quibble about
any reluctance of insurers to assume this role; managing cost is an
essential element of the product that managed care organizations
sell to their employer-custoiners. That ·said, the current popular
press makes abundantly clear that neither the general public nor
21. Pp. 35-39. Although these statements are generally accurate, the extent of patient
reluctance to make these decisions varies based on individual characteristics of the patient
and the nature of the illness. With the development of the Internet, patient support groups
abound, and information is more readily accessible to patients than it once was when medical
libraries, geared toward medical professionals, were the principal source of information.
Many patients with chronic conditions maintain that they are more knowledgeable about
their individual medical needs than their physicians, despite their lack of broad-based clinical
educations. See generally Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care Different? Old Questions, New
Answers, 13 J. HEALTII PoL. PoLY. & L. 227 {1988).
22. Pp. 39-43. Professor Hall refers to the importance of the healing effect of the trust
based relationship between patient and physician several times throughout this work. He
maintains that the trust between patient and physician is born in part of necessity, and there
fore is resilient. He also relies on the systemic trust that society accords the medical profes
sion. Pp. 176-77. He does not persuade me that the implementation of his proposal - that
physicians may withhold beneficial care from their patients without disclosing either the role
of cost in that decision or the physician's personal financial incentives - will not over time
undercut both the systemic trust society places in medicine and the trust that a patient ac
cords her physician.

23. For proposed sample contract clauses and an excellent discussion of rationing through
contract, see generally Cr.ARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTII CARE CHorCES: PRIVATE
CoNTRAcrs AS INSTRUMENTS oF HEALTII REFoRM {1995).
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the medical establishment is comfortable with the current system of
payer as medical decisionmaker.24 Regulators fear the wrath of the
electorate or special interest groups for unpopular, difficult deci
sions.25 Insurers fear a hostile judicial system when their decisions
are challenged.26 Tue judicial system, in tum, is time-consuming,
expensive, reactive, driven by fact-specific precedent, and ill
equipped to investigate scientific questions.27
Nonetheless, each of these groups makes some medical spend
ing decisions. When developing health benefit designs, insurers de
cide which medical treatments will be included under the terms of
coverage (p. 68). Legislators override insurers' coverage decisions
that are perceived by the public as the most egregious, such as so
called outpatient mastectomies and drive-through deliveries.28
Courts are frequently asked to intervene in decisions to deny cover
age for treatments deemed experimental or investigational (pp. 6873). Among the most recent spate of cases are those involving de
mands for autologous bone marrow transplants for advanced breast
cancers and other malignancies.29
Technocrats are not as self-interested as payers, nor as con
trolled by public opinion as regulators (pp. 73-91). As deci
sionmakers, however, technocrats are rule-based. While rules offer
the advantages of simplicity and fairness, they can.not capture indi
vidual factors and values. Tuey also tend to isolate the caregiver
from the patient. Even establishing . the rules is problematic.
Although some clinical guidelines exist, we do not have available a
comprehensive set of outcome measures that considers all the
myriad individual clinical factors that might affect a caregiver's
professional judgment. Creating a technocratic system for decision24. See GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTii AGAINST W EALTii: HMOs AND TiiE BREAKDOWN
OF MEDICAL T RUST (1996). Anders, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, recounts anecdo·
tal evidence of poor care provided to HMO enrollees. For a critique of the book, see Sarah
E. Idelson, Book Notice, Health Against Wealth: HMOs and the Breakdown ofMedical Trust,
95 MICH. L. REv. 2090 {1997).

25. P. 66. Most medical-spending decisions made by legislators and regulators with re
spect to managed care enrollees are decisions to spend, rather than decisions to ration. See
infra note 28.
26. See Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers:
An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1055 (1996).
27. For an insightful discussion of the role of the judicial system in health care policy, see
Peter Jacobson, The Role of Private Litigation in Monitoring Managed Care (1998) (unpub
lished manuscript on file with author).

28. See, e.g., D.C. CoD E ANN. § 35-1102.l {1981) (inpatient postpartum treatment); 215
ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356t (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) {post-mastectomy care).
29. See, e.g., Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994) {finding that
high dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant treatment fell within plan
exclusion of coverage for treatment connected with medical research); Adams v. Blue Cross/
Blue Shield of Maryland, 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991) {finding that high dose chemother·
apy with autologous bone marrow transplant was not experimental and was covered by the
plan).
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making, therefore, would add cost to an already costly health care
delivery system without eliminating the need for a bedside deci
sionmaker to determine when and how to apply the rules.
The final third-party category considered by Professor Hall is
the democrats, representative citizen groups who would discuss and
decide resource allocation. Like the ultimate consumers of health
care services, members of the citizen groups would lack technical
medical knowledge. Like technocrats, they suffer from the short
comings of rule-based decisionmaking.
Professor Hall returns briefly to the role of each category of
decisionmaker in the final chapter of his book, concluding that no
category of decisionmaker is ideally suited for every kind of
medical-spending decision (pp. 241-48). He describes how society,
acting primarily through the market for health insurance, will deter
mine the proper role and mix of decisionmakers. Professor Hall's
analysis of who shall decide considers a wide range of undifferenti
ated medical spending decisions - from pure medical spending de
cisions, such as societal funding limits, to mixed spending-treatment
decisions, such as medical treatment options for individual pa
tients.30 The analysis also eliminates from its scope any considera
tion of the "how" of making medical spending decisions - the
criteria that will guide the decisionmaker and the means to enforce
the decisions made (p. 7). If Professor Hall were inclined to pre
scribe roles for each category of decisionmaker, then, the analysis
would have to be refined and expanded.

. B. Physicians and Bedside Rationing
Despite its title, this book is principally concerned with physi
cian decisionmaking at the bedside, the topic Professor Hall ad
dresses in Chapters Four and Five. Professor Hall characterizes the
dominant position in the medical community as "a nearly absolute
moral prohibition" of any cost consideration in treatment decisions
(p. 114), and the dominant view in the ethical and legal communi
ties as "unanimously" against bedside rationing of health care re30. Managed ·care organizations point out that their medical spending decisions are in
tended to be decisions about whether the managed care organization will, or will not, pay for
a course of treatment or a diagnostic test. Treatment decisions, in contrast to payment deci
sions, can only be ·made by the licensed professional who will provide and the patient who
will.receive the prescribed course of treatment. See, e.g., Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Arizona
Insurance Contract, available in Appellants' Opening Brief app. A at 27, Mufphy v. Board of
Medical Examiners of Arizona, 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) -(No. 95-0327) ("THE
FACT THAT A PHYSICIAN HAS PRESCRIBED, ORDERED, RECOMMENDED, OR
APPROVED A SERVICE OR SUPPLY DOES NOT MAKE IT MEDICALLY NECES
SARY OR MAKE THE CHARGE ELIGIBLE FOR BENEFIT S .. .. This is not intended
to alter or influence a Provider's clinical judgment in providing your care. It is intended only
to outline the reimbursement guidelines which apply to this Benefit Plan.") (emphasis in
original) (on file with author).
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sources (p.117). He refers to the prohibition of cost consideration
in clinical decisionmaking as the "absolute quality ethic," under
which "any marginal medical benefit, no matter how small, is worth
absolutely any price...."31 He also acknowledges two other view
points on physician consideration of cost. The first is that physi
cians may consider cost in clinical decisions as a means to avoid
rationing by third parties, but that they must be insulated from any
personal economic stake in their rationing decisions (p. 115). The
second view, which Hall classifies as a minority view, is that physi
cians may engage in resource allocation under the influence of per
sonal financial incentives (p.115). Professor Hall embraces this last
view.
Discussing this view, Professor Hall notes that no "moral and
political defense"has been offered in its support (p.115). Rather, it
appears to arise from market realities. Although I anticipated that
Professor Hall's task in this part of the book would be to articulate
the positive case in support of physician rationing induced by per
sonal financial incentives, he chooses to target the arguments in
support of the absolute quality ethic. He reasons that to under
stand the "proper form and limits [of rationing],"the "ethical and
legal taboo" associated with rationing must be overcome (p. 127).
Much of the analysis in this section of the book, therefore, is
reactive. The near-mythical role of the physician with his exclusive
focus on the well-being of his patient, without regard to cost, per
sonal gain, or personal sacrifice, supplies the analytical target. Pro
fessor Hall insightfully critiques historical mainstream thinking, or
at least oft-quoted rhetoric, that physicians are barred from any
consideration of cost in clinical decisionmaking at the bedsides of
individual patients. He addresses and rejects in turn both practical
arguments, such as the potential for physicians to abuse the author
ity to ration (pp. 121-22), and theoretical arguments, such as those
based on role morality (p.133), professional ethics (pp.128-29), and
bioethics (pp. 137-43).
Professor Hall's discussion of professional ethical and bioethical
support for the absolute quality ethic is the reader's first introduc
tion to the analytical role of insurance selection.32 In Hall's view, a
consumer who chooses a less costly, restrictive form of health insur
ance has expressed a value preference for "less than optimal medi
cal benefit" in exchange for economic well-being.33 Accordingly,
31. P. 115. While I believe that these characterizations overstate the prevailing objection
to cost consideration, they do provide an effective foil for Professor Hall's analysis.
32. The organization of the book seems sensible, but perhaps unavoidably leads to some
repetition of critical insights, given that the role of insurance selection underlies much of the
analysis.
33. P. 137. See also discussion infra at Part II.
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he maintains that neither physician beneficence34 nor patient auton
omy35 requires that physicians ignore cost in clinical decisions if the
patient has made this selection (pp. 135-42). Cost-conscious clinical
decisionmaking fulfi11s the physician's obligation of beneficence, be
cause it serves both the patient's medical and economic well-being.
Viewing this choice from an ex ante perspective, Hall asserts that a
physician ,is required by the patient's direction expressed through
insurance selection to trade the patient's medical interest for the
patient's economic interest at the time of treatment (p. 138). Pro
fessor Hall argues that it is only the ex post perspective, viewed at
the time of tr.eatment rather than the time of insurance selection,
that leads to "erroneous thinking"; when physicians consider costs
they are trading off the patient's welfare for the welfare of others in
society (p. 138). On similar reasoning, Professor Hall maintains
that respect for patient autonomy does not bar bedside rationing
when a patient has selected a restrictive form of insurance (p. 143).
A patient exercises her autonomy by selecting an insurance vehicle.
Through selection of a restrictive benefit design, a patient delegates
to her physician the authority to make cost conscious medical deci
sions for the duration of the insurance contract term.36 Professor
Hall concludes in this section that the absolute quality ethic is not in
keeping with current economic and medical realities and is not re
quired by the role that physicians are asked to play in society. It
must therefore be rejected.
Exposing the analytical weaknesses of the arguments in support
of the absolute quality ethic is a necessary step to establish that the
absolute quality ethic is not.viable. But it offers little understanding
of the moral, legal, or ethical limits of physician rationing. To begin
to explore those limits, the reader must. compare Professor Hall's
definition of bedside ra_tioning with current clinical practice to de
termine how radical a change in. physician conduct is required by
this proposal.37
34. Beneficence has its origins in the Oath of Hippocrates: "I will follow that system of
regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my pa
tients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. " For one translation, see
Hippocratic Oath, in 14 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 218 (International Edition 1976).
35. Patient autonomy is a right to self-determination. The principles of beneficence and
autonomy clash when the patient's choice would direct the physician to practice medicine in
an unsound manner. For a discussion of the inherent tension between the two principles, see
J OHN ENGLEHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 82-84 (1986).
36. Although I do not find these arguments entirely persuasive for the reasons I state in
review, I particularly enjoyed Professor Hall's analogy to the myth of Ulysses and the
Sirens. Pp. 150-51.

this

37. Clinical practice varies 'videly by geographic region, physician, and clinical setting.

See generally Jonathan Skinner & Elliott Fisher, Regional Disparities in Medicare
Expenditures: An Opportunity for Reform, 50 NATL. TAX J. 413 (1997). I am not suggesting

that clinical practice is static nor that current practices reflect an unchanging and unchange-
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C. A Problem of Definition and A Need for Direction
Physician bedside rationing, Professor Hall asserts, consists of
the "prudent trimming of incrementally beneficial services" (p. 118)
to deny managed care patients marginally beneficial treatment
when that denial is consistent with the prevailing standard of care.
An explicit cost-benefit analysis is not a prerequisite to physician
bedside rationing, as Professor Hall envisions it (p. 119). In prac
tice, requiring a cost-benefit analysis at the bedside would easily
defeat most bedside rationing, because medicine simply lacks the
outcome measures that would enable this analysis to occur.38
What services then would be encompassed in bedside rationing?
Professor Hall's answer is somewhat unclear. The examples he of
fers in the book include an extra diagnostic test or day in the hospi
tal, a more expensive drug, and a referral to a specialist when the
stakes are low or when confidence in the diagnosis and prognosis is
already high (p. 118). He goes on to caution that physicians should
not make "high-stakes, high-drama rationing decisions without con
sulting their patients or relying on explicit regulatory or contractual
authority," because of the "corrosive" effect on the patient
physician relationship.39
Given the discussion that preceded the "high-stakes, high
drama" limitation, I was perplexed by Professor Hall's implicit sug
gestion that physicians could make such rationing decisions without
patient involvement, even with explicit regulatory or contractual
authority. Regulatory or contractual authority would not eliminate
the corrosive effect that would inevitably result from a physician's
making such a significant decision without patient involvement.40
This cryptic statement goes unelaborated, although Professor Hall
hints that physicians might engage in bedside rationing in circum
stances that are decidedly not low stakes. For example, in his dis
cussion of bedside disclosures, Professor Hall suggests that it would
be "cruel" to tell a "Mississippi dirt farmer" that a treatment of
fered at Sloan-Kettering, located in New York City, had a one-inable commitment between medicine and society. Rather, my purpose is to explore the limits
of bedside rationing by exploring Professor Hall's definition of that term.

38. The science of medicine is still too inexact and the individual factors too numerous for
the development of a comprehensive set of guidelines that would make this cost-benefit anal
ysis an informed one. Professor Hall discusses this point when he addresses rule-based
spending decisions. Pp. 76-81.
39. P. 118 (emphasis added). Presumably, the kinds of cases that appear on the evening
news would fall into the "high-stakes, high-drama" category: autologous bone marrow trans
plants for metastatic cancers, organ transplants, and other last-option treatments that are
potentially lifesaving.
40. Would Hall consider an exclusion from insurance coverage contractual authority to
make a medical-spending decision to withhold expensive life-prolonging treatment without
the patient's express concurrence in that decision? If so, that would be a larger step away
from patient autonomy than I am prepared to take.
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one-thousand chance to cure his cancer (p. 199). This example sug
gests that marginally beneficial care might also include care that has
a low probability of very significant benefit in a life-or-death situa
tion. Including such care within the definition of marginally benefi
cial care that a physician is authorized to withhold from HMO
enrollees on the basis of insurance selection would, in my view, be
decidedly more controversial and more troubling than Professor
Hall's explicit statements that the physician's ability to withhold
marginally beneficial care encompasses small increments of care in
low-stakes, high-confidence situations.
Assuming that the more moderate examples accurately reflect
Professor Hall's proposal, how is bedside rationing different from
ordinary clinical judgment exercised by physicians as they go about
ruling out alternative explanations for a patient's symptoms? Pro
fessor Hall's work leaves one uncertain of the answer. He points
out a number of circumstances in which physicians currently engage
in bedside rationing, as he defines that term (pp. 121-25). Among
those he discusses are medical triage in emergencies,41 the cost-con
scious treatment of uninsured and underinsured patients,42 and
practice within resource-constrained environments, such as public
hospitals. Many other medical decisions to forego or delay care
would fall into Professor Hall's category of "nonstandard, unethi
cal, or unprofessional" care (p. 125). For example, a physician exer
cising sound medical judgment need not acquiesce to a patient's
request for medical testing merely intended for reassurance.43 To
borrow from Professor Hall's analysis, no matter how strong an
otherwise asymptomatic patient's fear of malignancy, a reasonable
physician would not feel compelled to comply with the fearful pa
tient's request to order a whole body CT scan, or monthly Pap
smears for the female patient. We may have a medical market
place, but it is not a supermarket where unlicensed consumer-

41. This is an example of absolute scarcity of resources, which is different from the type
of incremental decisions Hall cites. The decision is not based on cost of case, but on unalter
able resource limits. See Maxwell Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of
Scarce Resources: ls There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CqNN. L. REv. 349, 380-81 (1993).
42. From an ethical standpoint, a physician's task is easier when her patient's own inter
ests dictate cost-conscious decisionmaking, as they do when the patient is under- or unin
sured or otherwise lacks financial resources to pay for her care. The physician is asked to
follow the traditional ethical dictate that she consider her patient's interests superior to any
other interest. She is not asked to balance her patient's interests against the interests of
others in making a cost-based, clinical decision to withhold marginally beneficial care. See
generally Marcia Angell, The Doctor as Double Agent, 3 KENNEDY !NsT. OF ETHICS J. 279
(1993).
43. See Allan S. Brett & Laurence B. McCullough, When Patients Request Specific
Interventions, 315 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 1347 (1986).
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patients can shop for and purchase the medical technology of the
moment, regardless of the source of payment.44
Like Professor Hall's bedside rationing model, ordinary clinical
judgment also encompasses an incremental approach to patient
testing and treatment. Professor Hall offers a not entirely factual
example of his wife's ankle injury, where her physician decided to
wait and watch rather than order an expensive MRI to rule out an
unlikely possibility of serious injury (p. 117). A physician's decision
not to recommend a test or treatment because it has a low
probability of providing a healthy patient any significant benefit
would be consistent with both a physician's traditional duty to exer
cise sound professional judgment on the patient's behalf and with a
broader duty to serve society's need to control medical
expenditures. 4s
Organized medicine, while rejecting calls for bedside rationing,
accepts the cost-benefit analysis that is a part of standard clinical
judgment.46 Physicians are instructed to advocate with managed
care organizations on behalf of their patients for care that is of "ma
terial benefit."47 A lot of medical territory falls between an extra
diagnostic test and an organ transplant. Is the admonition that a
physician withhold marginally beneficial care a difference in kind or
a difference in degree from everyday decisions made by physicians?
If withholding marginally beneficial care envisions only ordinary
clinical judgment about small increments of additional care, as
seems to be suggested in some parts of the book (pp. 117-18), the
proposal might be too modest to have a significant impact on health
care spending or on health insurance premiums. If more than with
holding small increments of care is intended, as the case of the Mis
sissippi dirt farmer obliquely suggests, the limits were not disclosed.
Readers are left to ponder the qualitative, or quantitative, differ
ences between marginal benefit, cost-benefit, and material benefit,
and to wonder whether; or how much of, this debate about cost44. Id. at 1347 (noting that protection of the public health dictates that society impose
barriers to acquisition of potentially harmful medical commodities and services).

45. Mammograms for twenty-year-old patients who are not otherwise at enhanced risk
for breast cancer would fall into this category.
46. "Any broad allocation guidelines that restrict care and choices - which go beyond
the cost/benefit judgments made by physicians as a part of their normal professional respon
sibilities - should be established at a policy-making level so that individual physicians are
not asked to engage in bedside rationing." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS Wrm ANNOTATIONS Opinion 8.13(2)(A), Managed
Care, at 126 (1996-1997 ed.). The AMA does not further define its use of the term "bedside
rationing."
47. Id. at Opinion 8.13(2)(B) ("Regardless of any allocation guidelines or gatekeeper di·
rectives, physicians must advocate for any care they believe will materially benefit their
patients.").

May 1998]

Medical Rationing

1805

conscious clinical decisionmaking is based on differing definitions
of key terms.
Given the centrality of the concept of marginally beneficial care
to physicians' ability to act on the proposal set forth in this book that the physician may withhold marginally beneficial care without
their patients' informed consent - scant attention is paid to its pa
rameters.48 Future analyses of the benefit component of the cost
benefit analysis for marginally beneficial care should address the
relative weights of the probability of medical benefit from an addi
tional treatment or diagnostic intervention, the significance of the
probable benefit to the individual patient, the physician's confi
dence in her clinical judgment, and the availability of alternative
treatments or diagnostic interventions.
Physicians need guidance however, on more than matters of def
inition. A disappointing gap in this work is its lack of any direction
for physicians' behavior as they act as rationing agents at individual
patients' bedsides. The absolute quality ethic supplied a physician's
general objective, the means to serve that objective, and imposed a
limit on physician behavior. It was intended to focus physicians
solely on the medical needs of patients through a cost-blind method
of clinical decisionmaking. In the broadest sense, its ethical direc
tive was a condemnation of physician self-serving behavior.49 If we
abandon the absolute quality ethic, as Professor Hall argues persua
sively that we should, what will replace it? In a sense, whether phy
sicians may consider cost in clinical decisionmaking is the easy
question: they already do so, absolutist taboo notwithstanding.
This work supplies neither the objective, the means, nor the limita
tions on physician rationing conduct. Thus, the hard questions go
unanswered here.

D. Motivating Physicians with Financial Incentives
Having concluded that physicians are not bound by an absolute
quality ethic to ignore the cost of care, Professor Hall's analysis
turns to whether an absolute prohibition against the use of financial
incentives to motivate physicians to make rationing decisions is jus
tifiable (p. 172). Physicians have long been identified as the princi
pal culprits in the current state of affairs of ever-escalating health
care spending, for they have long controlled most health care
48. My suggested modification of Professor Hall's proposal envisions more disclosure to
and discussion with the patient The significance of the concept of marginally beneficial care
is lessened when patients are aware that a rationing decision is being made.
49. See Deborah A. Stone, The Doctor as Businessman: The Changing Politics of a
Cultural Icon, 22 J. IiEALTII Por.. PoLY. & L. 533, 534-35 (1997) ("The entire organization
and ideology of the profession was meant to show that doctors' decisions and reco=enda
tions were dictated by the best interests of the patient and by science - and distinctly not by
the pecuniary interests of the doctor. ").
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spending through their prescriptive practices. Patients are admitted
to the hospital, receive expensive procedures, and undergo surgery
upon physicians' orders. If we assume that physicians gave those
orders acting under a perceived directive that they could not, and
should not, be cost-conscious, will disabusing them of that notion
have a significant effect on future ordering practices? Incentives to
change have to be created.
In Chapter Five, Professor Hall discusses the law of fiduciary
responsibility and the agency cost theory of economics in conclud
ing that the use of financial incentives is a permissible method to
motivate physicians to make resource-allocation decisions. The
conflict of interest between patient and physician that is created by
giving physicians personal financial incentives to withhold care is
cured by patient consent to the conflict.50 By reference to the now
familiar insurance selection, Professor Hall suggests that a patient
who has been properly informed about rationing mechanisms
through the insurance selection process "may rationally agree to a
set of strategically crafted incentives that induce doctors to act as
both their medical treatment and their economic purchasing
agents" (p. 172).
Legal oversight through direct regulation of financial incentives
or through tort law can guard against financial incentives that work
too well and cause physicians to withhold too much care.51 In addi
tion, Professor Hall argues that managed care organizations can
provide oversight of the effects of financial incentives by monitor
ing care through the peer review process and grievance proceed
ings. Finally, he opines that the "physicians' own internalized ethic
of patient beneficence guards against corrupting influences" in the
role as rationing agent (p. 180).
I agree with Professor Hall's general conclusions that properly
informed patients can consent to the conflict of interest created by
financial incentives to withhold care. Although such disclosures are
now rare", recent legislative initiatives should make disclosures more
50. Although financial incentives to withhold care could create a conflict of interest be
tween physician, as fiduciary, and patient, as beneficiary, conflicts of interest are not abso
lutely barred in fiduciary relationships. Conflicts can be cured by proper disclosure, in many
circumstances. Professor Hall examines but finds nothing inherent in the particular relation
ship between patient and physician to suggest that disclosure cannot cure physician conflicts
of interest. Pp. 178-79. For a contrary view, see MARC A. RoDwIN, MEDICINE, MoNEY, AND
MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 42-43 (1993).
51. Relying on legal oversight begs the question. Legal oversight can take many forms.
The most recent is- a limit on the percentage of a physician's income that can be at risk
coupled with certain disclosure and reinsurance requirements. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1997).
For a discussion of approaches taken by the various states, see Allison Overbay & Mark A.
Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers that Bear Risk, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 361 (1996). An
other approach might be to require actuarial soundness of all reimbursement arrangements
that shift or share risk with physicians and managed care organizations.
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common.s2 I am somewhat less confident than Professor Hall
about the ability of financial incentives to produce rationing deci
sions that serve societal int�rests in overall health care spending,
rather than merely the physician's or managed care organization's
own economic well-being. The lack of empirical work in this area,
however, hampers any meaningful analysis.s3 While this lack of
certainty does not dictate a ban on the use of financial incentives, it
does suggest a need for effective controls.
Some of the oversight mechanisms suggested by Professor Hall
are fl.awed in their ability to restrict abuse that might result from
financial incentives. When patients are not fully informed that their
physicians are withholding some beneficial care, as is suggested by
this analysis, the availability of grievance procedures to dispute de
cisions to withhold care is of little practical value.s4 If, for example,
the patient is unaware that but for the source of payment, his at
tending physician would have referred him to a specialist, he cannot
effectively appeal that decision through a grievance procedure.ss
Similarly, the physician's traditional duty of beneficence as a means
of oversight will be compromised by including an economic element
in the balance, as is envisioned by Professor Hall's analysis.s6 Rely
ing on a duty that arises from the absolute quality to guard against
52. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-5(a)(2) (1997) (effective Feb. 4, 1998) (requiring
managed care plans to disclose information about financial incentives between participating
physicians under contract with the plan); VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 18, § 9414(a)(2)(C) (1997) (re
quiring managed care organizations to disclose financial inducements offered to any health
care provider or facility to reduce or limit health care services). In the marketing materials I
reviewed when writing this book review, however, only one of five mentioned the means of
physician reimbursement. See, e.g., infra notes 82-85.
53. See Henry Greeley, Direct Financial Incentives in Managed Care: Unanswered
Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53 (1996).
54. Professor Hall states "it is clear that no existing source of law ...requires the disclo
sure of the numerous HMO physician incentive payment plans ...." P.196. Since the publi
cation of this book, a U.S.court of appeals has ruled that ERISA fiduciaries must disclose
financial incentives to withhold care. See Shea v.Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir.1997). See
also The White House Office of Co=unications, Fact Sheet on Federal Health Plans (Feb.
26, 1998), 1998 WL 80261 (White House) (reporting that the President will issue a directive
aimed at ensuring that federal health plans come into compliance with the Consumer Bill of
Rights which requires, among other things, disclosure of financial incentives). But see Weiss
v.CIGNA Healthcare Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that HMO did not
breach its fiduciary duty for failing to disclosed financial incentives to lower rates of hospital
ization and referrals to specialists).
55. In testimony before a Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee convened to
consider the need for legislative initiatives to address the quality and accountability of man
aged care organizations, Karen Ignagni, President and CEO of the American Association of
Health Plans, cites to these mandated internal appeals processes to argue against additional
federal oversight. Statement on Health Plan Quality, May 20, 1997, (visited April 13, 1998)
<http://www.aahp.org/services/govemment&advocacy/policy/testimony/qualityk.htm>.
56. The duty of beneficence, which required that a physician subordinate his interests to
the medical needs of the patient, in its traditional formulation would have prohibited a physi
cian from acting on the economic incentive to do more - in managed care terms to "overu
tilize" - to enhance the physician's ·fin'!llcial well-being.
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an economic incentive that is premised upon a significant modifica
tion of that ethic seems disingenuous. A physician can serve her
own, as well as her patient's economic interests, by aggressively
withholding medical care. But aggressive withholding of care might
not be in the patient's medical interest.
A recent case illustrates these points quite poignantly.57 Patrick
Shea, a forty-year-old man with a family history of heart disease,
was experiencing severe chest pains and shortness of breath. He
was enrolled in a health maintenance organization. Accordingly, he
asked his primary care physician for a referral to a cardiologist. His
physician declined, assuring Mr. Shea that he was too young and
did not have enough symptoms to justify a visit to a cardiologist.
He was wrong. Several months later, Mr.Shea died of heart failure.
The HMO in which Mr.Shea was enrolled used physician financial
incentives to minimize specialist referrals. Mr. Shea was not ad
vised of that fact, nor was he advised whether his physician's clinical
decision was affected by his enrollment in an HMO. None of us can
say whether those simple disclosures would have caused Mr.Shea
to seek out additional care at his own expense or appeal the deci
sion not to refer him to a cardiologist, or whether either of those
actions would have saved his life. Mrs.Shea alleged that disclosure
of the financial incentive would have been enough to cause Mr.
Shea to visit a specialist.58 The court agreed that Mr.Shea should
have had the information necessary for him to make that choice.59
Meaningful patient disclosures are important, therefore, not
only to obtain consent to a physician's conflict of interest, but also
to give meaning to the mechanisms available to oversee the physi
cian's rationing of care under the influence of personal financial
incentives.
II.

I NFORMING CONSUMERS

In Chapter Six, Professor Hall considers the questions to what
extent and at what point resource allocation mechanisms must be
disclosed to the patient. Without purporting to resolve the specifics
of the disclosure, he concludes that global disclosure of resource
allocation mechanisms should be made by the managed care organ
ization to the consumer at the time of enrollment (pp. 194-98).
Physicians should reinforce this global disclosure at the time of the
first visit with the patient by reiterating the nature of managed care
57. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
58. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 627. Of course, this case might simply involve defendant's medi
cal error unrelated to cost considerations, or plaintiff's ex post analysis of events that might
have been.
59. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 629.
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and the physician's role in keeping costs down.60 These suggestions
are sound. But are they enough?
The more difficult question is whether and when the physician
must disclose the role of cost in her bedside treatment decisions. To
analyze this issue, Professor Hall focuses on the law of informed
consent.61 He concludes that expansion of the law of informed con
sent to require disclosure of the role of cost in a given clinical en
counter has not yet occurred. Such an expansion, he maintains,
would be unwise. I find his reasons for this conclusion
unpersuasive.62
First, Professor Hall maintains that bedside disclosure is imprac
tical, because physicians might not overtly engage in a cost-benefit
analysis in making clinical decisions. The physician is unable to dis
close his thought process to the patient because it is unconscious (p.
205). That physicians must sometimes be unaware of the role of
cost in a clinical decision, however, is no reason to relieve them of a
duty to disclose when a decision is knowirigly affected by the cost of
care and the source of payment. Since Professor Hall proposes in
this book that a physician's authority to ration is based on the pa
tient's enrollment in a restrictive insurance plan, a physician would
have to engage in some conscious thought. A physician must first
determine whether this patient is one to whom the duty of benefi
cence has been modified and from whom he has authorization to
ration through insurance selection. A but-for formulation of the
duty to inform would satisfy this concern. If the physician's clinical
decision would have been different but for the source. or method of
payment for the patient's care, then the role of cost should be dis
closed. Disclosure would give the patient the opportunity to pro
ceed with the care as recommended, to disagree and consider a
60. The term "first visit" might be misleading. The patient-physician relationship might
have predated the patient's enrollment in an HM:O. One of the primary factors in a con
sumer's selection of a plan is that the consumer's physician is under contract to the plan.
Physicians will be required to discuss these issues at the first visit after the patient enrolls in a
restrictive insurance plan. For a discussion of factors influencing consumer selection of a
managed care plan, see Deborah A. Gibbs et al., Consumer Perspectives on Information
Needs for Health Plan Choice, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW, Fall 1996, at 55; David
Mechanic, Commentary: Consumer Choice Among Health Insurance Options, HEALTH AFF.,
Spring 1989, at 138.
61. The law of informed consent, which arose from the law of battery, was concerned
with medical risks. P. 200. As the law of informed consent has evolved, the nature and scope
of required disclosure has expanded, and could now be interpreted to include decisions not to
treat. Pp. 202-04 and cases cited therein.
62. In my view, physicians should be legally required to engage in meaningful discussions
with their patients when but for the cost of care, their clinical decisions would have been
different. W hether this disclosure is accomplished through an extension of the legal doctrine
of informed consent or of standard fiduciary principles is less significant to me. I would not,
however, rely completely on aspirational pronouncements for fear that physicians would too
often fall short of achieving that aspiration. Cf. Hall & Berenson, supra note 16.
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grievance procedure through her managed care organization, or to
pay for additional care from personal resources.
Second, Professor Hall states that disclosure of the role of cost
in a clinical decision could harm the patient-physician relationship
by undermining the patient's trust in the physician's commitment to
the patient's medical welfare (pp. 205-06). Patient trust in the phy
sician is associated with a healing effect. If trust is lost, some psy
chological element of healing is also lost (pp. 39-40). I agree that
frequent disclosures that a physician's clinical decisions are cost
driven could undermine patient trust. But, if trust is lost, it is lost
because the physician has and regularly exercises the right to ration
the patient's care. Encouraging misplaced reliance on the physician
by withholding disclosure of truthful information would seem pater
nalistic at best and hazardous at worst.63
The risk of paternalism is apparent in Professor Hall's argument
that physicians should not have to disclose the role of cost in a par
ticular clinical decision because patients might prefer not to know
about the "unalterable reality of limited resources . . . at a time
when patients may be emotionally vulnerable and in need of reas
surance due to the extreme anxiety of serious illness" (p. 205). I
have two problems with this reasoning. First, if the patient is seri
ously ill and the care to be withheld is potentially lifesaving or life
prolonging, the situation is one of high-stakes, high-drama. The
earlier analysis seemed to conclude that such care is not marginally
beneficial and should not be subject to physician rationing without
patient involvement (pp. 117-18). Second, assuming that additional
resources are not available begs the question. Scarcity of resources
for marginally beneficial care is usually only relative, not absolute.
The unavailability of a donor liver is a typical example of absolute
scarcity. Resource scarcity in a market-based system is not neces
sarily unalterable when sources other than insurance coverage
might be available to the fully informed patient. That some pa
tients cannot afford to purchase additional care is not a reason to
withhold information about care options from all patients. If a pa
tient does not want to know that if she were a rich woman her phy
sician would make different clinical decisions, she can say so
directly. We need not rely on the fiction of insurance selection to
assume that HMO enrollees do not desire this information.
Finally, Professor Hall reasons that disclosures about the with
holding of care would give rise to contract disputes over the terms
of the insurance coverage (p. 206). Insurance plans generally re63. I also find unpersuasive the argument that withholding information from patients is
justified to avoid disputes between patient and physician about the physician's cost-based
clinical decision. That patients might make their physicians uncomfortable by disagreeing
with their clinical decisions is too convenient an excuse to avoid difficult discussions.
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quire payment for medically necessary services. Professor Hall
maintains that medical necessity is interpreted in practice as cover
ing any treatment that is "potentially of any medical benefit" (p.
206). His statement is accurate with respect to the relatively small
percentage of cases that are litigated, most, if not all of which fall
into the "high-stakes, high-drama" category and would be discussed
with the patient even under Professor Hall's analysis. Standard def
initions of medical necessity in managed care plans are more re
strictive.64 If the source of the medical-spending dilemma is that
the legal system is failing to enforce the terms of restrictive insur
ance contracts, that problem should be addressed directly through
the legal system, not indirectly through restricting information
about a consumer's contractual rights.65 In our market-based sys
tem of health care, consumers are entitled to the benefit of their
bargains with health maintenance organizations.66
Unlike Professor Hall, I have a fundamental reluctance to
forego disclosure of information to consumers for three reasons.
First, a market-based reason: efficient markets rely on the value
based purchasing decisions of informed consumers. In a market
based system, therefore, all relevant, available information should
be shared if we are to rely on the collective purchasing decisions of
consumers in the marketplace to yield the most efficient use of re
sources, or in this case, the best mix of medical spending deci
sionmakers. Second, an ethics-based reason: patients have come to
rely on physicians' oft-stated ethical obligation to put tlie patient's
interest ahead of all other interests. A shift in that patient-directed
ethic should be clearly signaled to prevent misplaced reliance and
to alert patients to physicians' new roles. Third, a law-related rea
son: recent legislative actions rely on mandated consumer disclo
sures as a means to facilitate market oversight of managed care. A
64. See, e.g., PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN AGREEMENT § 12, Definition 12.7 (Aetna U.S.
Healthcare 1996) (on file with the author), providing that "Medically Necessary Services
shall mean . . . health care services that are appropriate and consistent with the diagnosis . . .
and which are likely to result in demonstrable medical benefit, and which are the least costly
of alternative supplies or levels of service which can be safely and effectively provided. . . ."
65. Any prudential concern with enforcement of medical necessity provisions in managed
care contracts loses importance as managed care organizations delegate utilization manage
ment responsibility to physicians who are reimbursed on a capitated basis. See Peter D.
Jacobson et al., Defining and Implementing Medical Necessity in Washington State and
Oregon, 34 INQUIRY 143 (1997).
66. Ironically, the managed care industry itself rejects the suggestion that physicians
should withhold information from patients. The 1998 accreditation standards adopted by the
National Committee on Quality Assurance require that managed care organizations have a
written policy stating that "[M]embers have a right to a candid discussion of appropriate or
medically necessary treatment options for their conditions, regardless of cost or benefit cov
erage," as well as the right "to participate with practitioners in decision making regarding
their healthcare." See STANDARDS FOR THE AccREDITATION OF MANAGED CARE
ORGANIZATIONS, Standards for Members' Rights and Responsibilities 189, Standard Rules
1.3 & 1.4 (National Committee on Quality Assurance 1998).
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proposal that may result in the intentional withholding of informa
tion from HMO enrollees could thwart those efforts and have the
unintended consequence of more intrusive, expensive, and burden
some means of regulating managed care organizations.

A. Insurance Selection as Informed Consent
In response to these difficulties with providing bedside informa
tion about and obtaining patient consent to cost-conscious medical
decisions, Professor Hall returns to the centrality of insurance selec
tion to formulate a theory of economic informed consent.67 Before
I explain why I doubt selection of an HMO can be a viable substi
tute for information and consent, I wish to note some prudential
problems with the operation of a theory of economic informed con
sent. First, I am troubled by the suggestion that information will be
provided only in response to specific questions from a patient. This
aspect of the theory favors sophisticated consumers who will know
enough to ask the right questions to obtain information and further
disadvantages the neediest individuals.68 To the extent that physi
cians might act on unconscious biases in favor of educated, affluent
patients, this theory exacerbates the problem.69 To the extent that
the theory applies only to HMO enrollees, a subject to which I turn
next, it also makes HMO enrollees bear the brunt of societal efforts
to curb medical spending not solely through their insurance
purchase but also by restricting information that would permit them
to make future choices.1°
67. P. 209. Under this theory, when a consumer decides to enroll in a health maintenance
organization, the consumer knowingly elects a style of medicine that rations "marginally ben·
eficial care" either through the payer's centralized rules or the physician's bedside discretion.
P. 210. This selection of a health care benefit design constitutes either advance consent to, or
waiver of the right of informed consent to, withholding items of treatment or diagnostic serv
ices based on their costs, if the patient is informed of the rationing rules and incentives at the
time of enro11ment. P. 211. Detailed disclosures about the role of cost in a clinical decision at
the time of treatment would be required only in response to specific questions by the patient.
This principle of nondisclosure would not apply to "high-stakes" or "value-laden" treat·
ments. P. 226. Examples of high-stakes decisions include terminating life support and life·
saving surgery. Value-laden treatments are those of particular importance to a given patient,
for example treatment to avoid slight physical impairments to athletes or performing artists.
P. 226. Professor Hall leaves the precise details for later work.
68. As consumers become aware of the "if you don't ask, I won't tell" approach to the
role of cost in clinical decisions, even less sophisticated consumers will begin to ask, curing
both the problem I raise here as well as tending over time to eliminate the utility of the
theory of economic informed consent.
69. Professor Hall rejects the potential for abuse of the authority to ration as an argu
ment in favor of the absolute quality ethic. Pp. 119-22. I raise the potential for abuse here
only to suggest that in fashioning a system for physician rationing, factors that might exacer
bate the opportunity for abusive decisionmaking should be avoided.
70. To the extent this proposal permits discrimination based on source of payment, physi
cians complying with it would be violating standard provisions in some managed care con
tracts that prohibit physician discrimination against their enrollees on the basis of source of
payment. See, e.g., PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN AGREEMENT {Aetna), supra note 64 {"Pro-
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Second, Professor Hall does not explicitly address whether the
theory of economic informed consent can be applied to managed
care be.nefit designs other than HMOs. If the theory applies only to
HMO enrollees, it will apply to fewer patients over time as less re
strictive managed care benefit designs enter the marketplace and
displace HMOs. Consider, for example, the fastest growing benefit
design, the point-of-service plan. This benefit design permits the
enrollee to decide at each clinical encounter whether to comply
with the more restrictive HMO-like rules in exchange for an en
hanced financial benefit or to avoid these restrictions by accepting a
lower coverage level. Even if I were to accept Professor Hall's view
that insurance selection is more than a present-day consumption
decision, I would view selection of a benefit design in which a con
sumer retains the right to trade-off levels of coverage for self-di
rected care at each clinical encounter as an affirmative declaration
that that consumer does not waive the right to decide about individ
ual items of treatment. Selection of a point-of-service plan may
therefore be viewed as a rejection of the "bundled consent to a di
minished standard of care" (p. 212) on which Hall's theory of eco
nomic informed consent is based. In addition to these concerns, for
reasons discussed below I have significant doubts that a physician
can properly interpret a patient's selection of an HMO as a proxy
for the patient's consent to the physician's withholding of margin
ally beneficial care.
Professor Hall offers informed choice of an insurance plan as a
means to reach "an attractive solution to virtually any question of
medical ethics" that involves "the delivery or refusal of services po
tentially paid for by insurance" (p. 248). In the final chapter of this
book, he considers a variety of moral and political perspectives,
from classic individual liberalism through communitarianism, to de
termine whether the shortcomings in the marketplace for insurance
undermine the use of insurance selection to resolve medical ethical
issues. His cogent analysis throughout this work has caused me to
take his suggestions about insurance selection more seriously than I
would have thought possible. In the end, however, we have a philo
sophical disagreement about the conclusions that can be reached
based on source of payment. I also have pragmatic concerns about
a suggestion that physicians do not have an obligation to provide
information to HMO patients about cost-conscious decisions. I am
vider shall not differentiate or discriminate in the treatment, or in the access to treatment, of
Members on the basis of . . . source of payment for services, . . . status as Members, . . . .");
Medical Service Agreement with a Primary Care Group (Blue Cross Network - Southeast
Michigan 1996) (on file with the author) ("Physician agrees . . . [t]o provide Covered Services
to Members in the same manner and equal in quality and promptness as services are pro
vided to the Physicians' [sic] other patients.").
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simply unpersuaded that one can, or should, reason from source of
payment to a whole schema of preferences.
B.

The Market for Health Insurance

Professor Hall and I agree that the market for health insurance
is imperfect, although we might differ on the weight and impact of
those market failings on placing broad reliance on purchasing deci
sions. The theory of economic informed consent requires more dis
closures at the time of enrollment than presently occur and,
therefore, depends upon a correction of some of the market failures
I discuss. My first, but not only, objection to relying on insurance
selection as a proxy for specific information and consent arises from
these imperfections in choice and information.
In choosing an HMO, does a consumer signal a choice for less
than optimal medical benefit, thereby authorizing her physician to
engage in bedside rationing? As an initial matter, even classifying
the selection of a health benefit design as a choice be may mislead
ing. Many working Americans do not have a selection of employer
provided health benefit plan designs from which to choose.71 Pro
f essor Hall acknowledges this lack of choice ( p . 252) .
"[A]cknowledging that any restriction in choice entails a moral
compromise of the ethical ideal," Hall asks, "is there a point at
which choice is so constrained that liberalism attaches absolutely no
moral force to a subscriber's enrollment decision?" (p. 250).
My question is somewhat different. It is not whether a patient
can be held to the consequences of a choice without options, but
rather what does insurance selection tell us about the consumer's
choices. Under Professor Hall's theory, insurance selection is the
means by which a patient moderates a physician's duty of benefi
cence and authorizes and consents to the effects of physician ration
ing. I ask, therefore, whether a physician, acting under the twin
burdens of physician beneficence and respect for patient autonomy,
can reach a conclusion about patient values and preferences based
on the source of payment for the patient's care. My answer is that
insurance selection is scant evidence from which to reach any
conclusions.
Consider an example. Assume that the only benefit design
available to a forty-five-year-old woman through her employer does
not cover annual mammograms for women between the ages of

71. See Karen Davis & Cathy Schoen, Managed Care, Choice, and Patient Satisfaction,
THE CoMMONWEAL1H FUND (Aug. 1997) <http://www.cmwf.org/health_care/satis.html>
(showing percentages of Americans with choice of health plans).
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forty and fifty.72 Assume that this woman's physician regularly dis
cusses the benefits and detriments of annual mammograms with her
and that he regularly prescribes annual mammograms for his forty
something year-old patients. Following Professor Hall's proposal
and viewing this example from the physician's point of view, when
the patient is an HMO enrollee, the physician must first determine
whether a mammogram for patients in this age group is "marginally
beneficial care."73 If the physician concludes that such care would
be marginally beneficial, under Professor Hall's theory he is author
ized to withhold this diagnostic test on the basis of its cost without
engaging in his customary discussion with his patient.74
Consider now the HMO enrollee's point of view. A mam
mogram is a diagnostic test that many women can afford for a dis
ease that many women greatly fear. The HMO enrollee is bound
by the terms of her coverage. She has - and should have - no
legal or moral claim to payment from the HMO regardless whether
she had a choice of plans. She might, however, reasonably elect to
pay out-of-pocket for a mammogram. She cannot make this deci
sion, however, if she is not informed of the cost basis for the physi
cian's clinical decision. An educated woman might ask. A less
sophisticated, or more trustfug, woman might simply conclude that
the doctor knows best. All my hypothetical HMO enrollee has
done is make a rational decision to accept the health care coverage
that is available from her employer, with its limitations, rather than
to decline employer-sponsored coverage altogether. This decision
might not involve any legally or morally cognizable coercion or du
ress.75 But it is a weak basis on which to conclude that she has
made an autonomous decision to forego both medical care that her
physician unilaterally concludes is marginally beneficial and the op
portunity to receive information about or have input into that
decision.
The benefit design as proxy for patient participation in decision
making can be problematic, however, even when an employee has a
72. The woman might not be aware of this coverage limitation, as it is likely to fall into
the amorphous category of "not medically necessary" based on the conflicting medical data,
rather than to be listed in the policy as a specific exclusion from coverage.
73. A mammogram arguably falls within the broad parameters defining marginally bene
ficial care. It is an "extra diagnostic test" intended to supplement a physician's confidence
based on a manual breast examination. In addition, medical data are inconclusive on the
number of lives saved as a result of mammograms for women under fifty years of age.
74. Professor Hall's proposal presumes that marginally beneficial care will be withheld
only in circumstances when the withholding of that care would not constitute medical negli
gence. P. 118. For purposes of this discussion, therefore, I do not reach the question whether
a physician would be shielded from malpractice liability for withholding care by disclosing
that he was making a cost-based decision to deny care. For a discussion of the effect of
resource limits on medical negligence standards, see E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets
Resource Limits: Restmcturing the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. PrIT. L. REv. 1 (1997).
75. Cf. pp. 250-51.
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choice of benefit designs. An employee obtaining health coverage
through an employer health benefit plan makes the choice for her
self and for all her covered dependents. The unemployed spouse or
the college-student child has no choice and may have little or no
information about the employee's choice.76 The employee's choice,
therefore, directly and tangibly affects the rights of each dependent
under a theory of economic informed consent.77 Since a physician
rarely knows whether a patient herself selected the insurance vehi
cle or whether the selection was made without her express input,
the physician should be reluctant to assume that he has patient au
thorization for bedside rationing based solely on the source of pay
ment for a patient's care.1s
Lack of choice is not the only imperfection in the market for
health insurance. The information that is available to consumers
about their choices is also relevant to drawing conclusions about
their intent when they select an HMO. In the current market for
health insurance, consumers are frequently uninformed about or
misunderstand the nature of their options.79 If selection of a health
maintenance organization is intended to express a preference for
"less than optimal" medical benefit, consumers also may be affirm
atively misinformed about the nature of their purchase.so A brief
examination of the materials that are prepared by HMOs both to
promote and to describe their plans and that are provided to poten
tial HMO enrollees by their corporate employers proves this
point.81
76. For example, the managed care industry rarely discloses that employees' dependents
are not even given an opportunity to consent to the release of their own medical information.
A consent to release medical information is usually signed by the employee as part of the
enrollment process. The consent is treated as effective for all those covered through the
employee.
77. Cf. p. 249 ("On the surface, this liberal solution to virtually any question of medical
ethics [by reference to the type of insurance individuals choose] fails only in specialized areas
such as pregnancy, pediatrics, and contagious disease where one's enrollment and spending
decisions directly and tangibly affect the rights and interests of others.").
78. While an argument can be made that the dependent has appointed the employee to
act as her agent, a not unreasonable appointment given the nature of the relationship, I find
reliance on agency in this circumstance unnecessary. The dependent will be bound to the
terms of the insurance coverage selected by the employee. Here, I am suggesting only that a
physician need not rely on the double fiction that the patient selected the insurance vehicle
and that the insurance vehicle indicates ipso facto that the patient consents to the physician's
rationing decisions, when he can simply ask the patient about her preferences.
79. I agree with Professor Hall that subjective understanding cannot be the standard due
to individual limitations on ability to comprehend. Pp. 218-21. I would find that a managed
care organization fulfilled its obligation, if judged on an objective standard, it conveyed infor
mation reasonably calculated to inform enrollees and potential enrollees about the nature of
their purchase.
80. Professor Hall also acknowledges this problem. Pp. 196-97.
81. I received these materials from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill when
I was selecting my own health coverage.
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"At [HMO], our top priority· is your health . . . . [HMO] also
offers health and wellness programs that focus on your health."82
"We are committed to offering members top-quality medical care
and services . . . . [Y]ou and your doctor - not an insurance com
pany - decide[ ] what medical care is best for you."83
HMO promises enrollees "[a]n ongoing relationship with a per
sonal physician who coordinates your care and knows your medical
history, current medication, and personal preferences. . . . . If you
need to see a specialist, your personal physician will give you a
referral. "84

Even the names under which health maintenance organizations
conduct business undercut an assertion that less than optimal medi
cal benefits are offered.85
A knowledgeable consumer of health care services searches in
vain in the promotional materials for any statements conveying to
the unsuspecting that the coverage or the medical care will be less
than optimal. Asking consumers to indicate this choice by selecting
an HMO asks them to purchase a product that HMOs are not, or
have not admitted to, selling.

I would have difficulty accepting an economic theory of in
formed consent even if the market imperfections that I have dis
cussed so far were corrected. In my view, the selection of insurance
coverage is simply that: a choice of those risks that the insured
wishes to transfer to the insurer through the payment of a premium.
The role of an insurance market is not to resolve physicians' ethical
dilemmas, but to enable risk-averse people to eliminate the finan
cial effects of risks that they have to face.86
An individual who elects not to insure against a risk should not
be able to look to the insurer for indemnification when the risk
presents itself.87 Although the economic decision whether to
82. Prudential Health Care materials given to potential enrollees (Sept. 1996) (on file
with author) (emphasis in original).
83. Kaiser Health Plan marketing materials given to potential enrollees (1996) (on file
with the author) (emphasis in original).
84. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of North Carolina marketing materials given to potential enrollees (undated) (on file with the author) (emphasis omitted).
85. See, e.g., "Optimum Choice of the Carolinas, Inc."
86. See MICHAEL L.KATZ & HARVEY S. RosEN, MICROECONOMICS 190 (2d ed. 1994).
87. Professor Hall relies on this ex ante versus ex post perspective to point out the short
comings of the judicial system in resolving coverage disputes. P. 70. A review of the case law
involving disputes about scope of health care coverage leaves the reader wondering what
more an insurer could do to make clear its intention to exclude coverage for a medical proce
dure. See, e.g., Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 67 F.3d 53, 55 (4th Cir. 1995)
(contract disclaiming coverage of "[a]utologous bone marrow transplants or other forms of
stem cell rescue (with high dose chemotherapy and/or radiation) . . . [as] determined by the
Company in its sole discretion" ambiguous with respect to coverage for high dose chemother
apy for stage IV breast cancer). Such disputes, however, will generally be unaffected by this
proposal, since the disputed medical treatment is invariably a "high-stakes, high-drama"
treatment of last resort See supra text accompanying notes 38-47. Even when this proposal
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purchase insurance, therefore, is of critical financial significance in
the event a risk materializes or a loss occurs, it is not a reliable
indicator of a consumer's response when confronting the eventual
ity. A car owner might elect not to insure an automobile against
theft and still elect to buy a new car if the uninsured car is stolen.88
Similarly, a health care consumer might decide not to insure against
a perceived remote risk of organ failure, but when faced with that
eventuality, the consumer-cum-patient might elect to finance (or at
tempt to finance) an organ transplant through means other than her
insurance carrier.
In the less dramatic realm, a consumer might enroll in an HMO
that has adopted clinical protocols that require a patient to undergo
a barium enema before, or in lieu of, a colonoscopy.89 When such
diagnostic testing is actually required, that same consumer might
prefer to pay out-of-pocket for the more comprehensive and less
uncomfortable colonoscopy, valuing a better diagnostic tool against
a potentially fatal disease more than other potential uses for the
patient's discretionary funds.90 But she cannot make this autono
mous election, even from her own funds, if her physician relies on
her source of payment to justify failing to inform her that, but for
her enrollment in an HMO, he would have recommended the more
costly, but more accurate, diagnostic tool. Even assuming that a
consumer is informed of and consents generally to an HMO's over
all philosophy of cost-conscious clinical decisionmaking, a con
sumer should not be expected to agree with each specific coverage
decision.
Professor Hall maintains that "the precommitment [to physician
rationing] entailed in HMO enrollment is properly viewed as pro
tection against an anticipated period of irrational influence caused
by the distorting incentives of insurance" (p. 153). In my view, the
would apply, however, and the medical spending dilemma results from an insured's demand
exceeding insurer coverage, I would prefer a solution that looks to the insurance industry and
the relationship between insurer and insured to one that resolves the dilemma by keeping
patients uninformed about their medical options.
88. For reasons I cannot explain, my anecdotal experience suggests that health law teach
ers and health law students are inordinately fond of automobile analogies. See, e.g.,
HAVIGHURST, supra note 23, at 104 (health care coverage and Cadillac); Susan D. Goold,
Allocating Health Care: Cost-Utility Analysis, Informed Democratic Decision Making, or the
Veil ofIgnorance?, 21 J. HEALTH PoL. PoLY. & L. 69, 72 (contrasting health care services and
Mercedes-Benz automobiles); David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of
Health Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 49, 49

n.7 (1996) (rationing health care contrasted with unaffordability of cars).
89. A colonoscopy detects a higher percentage of masses than does a barium enema. A
barium enema is cheaper. See Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical
Technology, and the Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MEo. 331, 346,
n.108 (1996). That the consumer made such an election knowingly is unlikely. Guidelines
used to make medical necessity determinations are generally considered proprietary informa
tion and are not \videly revealed.
90. This example is not hypothetical.
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"distorting incentives of insurance" can be minimized by enforcing
the terms of limited insurance: an HMO need not pay for all the
care that might be demanded. Having to bear the cost of a decision
to purchase more care than is covered by the HMO will protect
against "irrational infl.uence[s] ." Restricting treatment choices
through silent physician rationing is too drastic a remedy.
I am not proposing that a physician may never consider cost in
making clinical decisions at the bedside. I agree with Professor Hall
that the absolute quality ethic is not sustainable and that physicians
cannot and should not ignore the cost of their clinical decisions.
Because I do not believe that a patient's economic decision about
insurance does or should dictate a physician's ethical obligations to
a patient, I would extend the theory to suggest that if the absolute
quality ethic is abandoned, the ethic that replaces it should apply to
all patients, not merely HMO enrollees. I am also not suggesting
that the law impose on a physician an obligation to disclose to a
patient the physician's unconscious or automatic cost-benefit analy
sis in making clinical decisions. My proposal is a more modest one.
If a physician makes a clinical decision that is significantly influ
enced by the source of payment or by the physician's own financial
interest, she should discuss the basis of that clinical decision with
the patient. To return to my examples, if a physician regularly or
ders annual mammograms for women in their forties, she should
disclose to HMO enrollees that if their insurance were more exten
sive, she would be inclined to order a mammography. If a physician
would order a colonoscopy except for an HMO's payment policies,
she should disclose that choice to her patient. Nothing prevents the
payer from making the medical spending decision about the treat
ment for which it will remit payment. But the patient should have
some input into the treatment decision even if that requires that she
pay for the care out-of-pocket. That individuals with fewer finan
cial resources will not always have the option to pay and, therefore,
will receive less treatment than more affluent patients is regretable
but inevitable in a market-based system.
C.

A Return to a Professional Dominance Model?

Coupling bedside rationing with the theory of economic in
formed consent foretells a return to a physician dominance model
of medical decisionmaking, a model that has been rejected by schol
ars, policymakers, and physicians for nearly thirty years.91 This
modem version of the physician dominance model is more objec91. See THOMAS A. MAPPES & JANE S. ZEMBATY, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 44-45 (1981) (dis
cussing the criticism of medical paternalism that arose as the lay attitudes toward healthcare
professionals shifted to a greater emphasis on the right of patients to act as "autonomous
decision makers").
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tionable than its historical counterpart, due to the elimination of
the traditional formulation of physician beneficence.
Under a paternalistic model of medical care delivery, the physi
cian acted as the patient's guardian, exercising medical judgment to
determine and implement what was in the physician's view best for
the patient.92 Since medical well-being was the physician's goal, he
was content to ignore the patient's autonomy, when, in the physi
cian's view, the two came into conflict. A physician imparted to the
patient only such information that he deemed necessary to per
suade the patient to comply with the physician's determinations.
The patient's autonomy, such as it was, was limited to patient assent
to the physician's decisions, expressed generally through simple,
and silent, acquiescence. The physician-dominance model assumed
that the physician could determine the patient's interests without
patient input, and that the patient impliedly consented to the physi
cian's decisions by seeking the physician's assistance.
In ensuing decades, bioethicists rejected this view and came to
focus on the centrality of patient autonomy as a counterbalance to
physician dominance in the patient-physician relationship.93 The
pretense that a patient agreed to every decision made by the physi
cian she freely selected was abandoned. In my view, Professor
Hall's argument that a patient consents to each of her physician's
cost conscious decisions merely by enrolling in a health mainte
nance organization is a thinly · disguised, slightly updated version of
the long-rejected premise that a patient impliedly consents to a phy
sician's subsequent clinical decisions merely by seeking the physi
cian's assistance.
The consent that can be implied through an informed enroll
ment process then is not consent to later clinical decisions, but
rather, consent to confront a physician's potential conflict of inter
est in a managed care setting.94 Global disclosures by an HMO to
potential enrollees provide information, or a warning, that HMO
physicians have obligations in addition to those to their patients and
that incentives have been provided to those physicians to fulfill the
other obligations. The enrollee's consent, expressed through an in
formed enrollment process, therefore, is an expression of a willing
ness to proceed with the relationship in the face of the conflict. But
consenting to the existence of a conflict of interest is not the legal,
92. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda J. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient
·
Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992).
93. The cornerstone of patient autonomy is the right to control bodily integrity through
the informed consent process. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
94. See Martin Gunderson, Eliminating Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care Organiza·
tions Through Disclosure and Consent, 25 J.L. MEo. & ETHICS 192 (1997).
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moral, or ethical equivalent to acceptance of all effects of that
conflict.
Conflicts between patients and physicians existed long before
managed care.95 And I agree with Professor Hall that elimination
of all conflicts between physician and patient is neither practical nor
legally required (pp. 174-75). But knowledge that a conflict exists is
not the same as consent to the results of that conflict.96 Patients
have never been deemed to consent, or to waive the right to con
sent, to overutilization of medical services merely because they
were aware of the financial incentives to overtreat that exist in fee
for-service medicine. Simple disclosure that an ophthalmologist
owns an interest in an ambulatory care center where radial ker
atotomy is performed is not enough to excuse a physician's discus
'
sion of a p atient' s treatment options when the physician
recommends keratotomy at that facility. Whether under fee-for
service medicine, where a physician may benefit financially by hav
ing a patient elect radial keratotomy, or under managed care, where
an physician may benefit financially from withholding that treat
ment option, a patient whose vision is failing has a reasonable ex
pectation that her p�ysician will discuss all options with her. A
simple disclosure of the financial conflict of interest is not enough
to inform the patient about those options.

D. Disclosures

as

a Means of Oversight

A proposal that is likely to result in the withholding of available
relevant information from health care consumers is inconsistent
with recent legislative and regulatory trends and could have unin
tended, and untoward, consequences for the managed care indus
try.97 Managed care is the marketplace response to demand for
health care reform. While the health policy debate rages about
whether managed care sholild be subject solely to market forces or
also to legislative oversight, state legislatures, the President, and
Congress have been busily calling for more disclosure by managed
95. For a discussion of conflicts in fee-for-service medicine, see generally RoDWIN, supra
note 49. See also Susan J. Goldberg, A Cure for What Ails? Why Medical Advocate ls Not
the Answer to Problems in the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1 SPG WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 325,
325-28 (1996).
96. See Kate T. Christensen, Commentary: A Physician's Perspective on Conflicts of
Interest, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199 (1997).
97. For a sampling of articles addressing issues related to market oversight versus regula
tion, see Jeffrey Boyd & Lauren Kelley, Health Law 2000: Regulation, Litigation, or
Strangulation, HEALTH AFF. Fall 1996, at 31; Tunothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of
Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market, 37 Aruz. L. REv. 825 (1995); Wendy
E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State Health Care Reform, 19
AM. J.L. & MED. 121 (1993); Stanley S. Wallack et al., Redefining Rate Regulation in a Com
petitive Environment, 21 J. HEALTH Poi.. POLY. & L. 489 (1996).
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care organizations to consumers.98 Without information, they rea
son, consumers have no power. Powerless consumers can lead to an
overreaching and unresponsive managed care industry.
From the perspective of. the managed care industry, if managed
care is going to be subject to legislative and regulatory oversight, as
seems inevitable in the current climate, mandating disclosures of
fers two significant benefits. First, disclosures are inexpensive, at
least when compared with other legislative options.99 This is partic
ularly true when, as here, the information that is to be disclosed is
readily available.100 Second, mandating disclosures intrudes less
into managed care operations than many other regulatory options.
For example, at least twenty states and the federal government
have enacted maternity lengths-of-stay bills that generally require
payers to offer forty-eight hours of coverage for uncomplicated vag
inal births and ninety-six hours for cesarean sections.101 At least
nineteen states have enacted so-called direct access statutes that en
able patients to avoid typical managed care restrictions that require
patients to obtain a referral from a primary care physician to access
a specialist.102 We need not decide the wisdom, or lack thereof, of
these enactments to conclude that they increase costs to consumers
and that they interfere with the operations of managed care
organizations.
In contrast, at least seventeen states have enacted laws or
promulgated regulations that require disclosure of various types of
information to managed care enrollees.103 The information ranges
from explanations of the procedures used to obtain a referral to a
specialist, to drug formularies and policies on covering experimen
tal and investigational procedures. Disclosure enhances consumer
choice and supports market-based health care. Disclosures about
the role of cost in clinical decisions similarly provide meaningful
information about the actual trade-offs between medical care and
cost. Assuming consumers have a choice to make, they can then
98. See, e.g., Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, Chapter One: Information
Disclosure, <http://www.hcqualitycommission.goV>; CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
§§ 1363(a)(l)-(14), 1363.5(a) (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.31(4)-(5) (West 1996); GA.
CODE ANN § 32-20A-5(1)(A)(i)-(xii) & (B) (1998); IDAHO CODE § 41-3914 (1991); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 176G, § 7 (West 1998); Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.442 (West 1997).
.

.

99. See Walter A. Zelman, Consumer Protection in Managed Care: Finding the Balance,
HEALTH A.FF. Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 158.
100. Since I propose only that physicians disclose the actual role of cost in their clinical
decisions, neither a managed care organization nor a physician will be required to obtain,
create, or compile information that is not readily available.
101. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 28.
102. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-107(5)(a) (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 33-24-56 & 33-24-59 (West 1998); 215 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/356r(b) (West 1998); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN § 215.17 (West 1998); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-b (McKinney 1997); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-51-38 (1997); TEX. INs. CoDE ANN art. 21.53D (West 1997).
103. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 97.
.

.
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decide whether they want to pay for a richer benefit package or
whether they would prefer to accept the limitations inherent in less
costly coverage.
Managed care organizations have already suffered a popular
backlash from an allegation that they were interfering with physi
cian communications with patients. Managed care contracts with
physicians were said to include gag clauses that restricted the physi
cian's ability to disclose treatment options to patients. A General
Accounting Office (GAO) report revealed that there were no gag
clauses that prohibited physicians from discussing medical options
with their patients in any of the HMO contracts it examined.104
The report did find the standard commercial terms prohibiting dis
closures of proprietary information and imposing antidisparage
ment and nonsolicitation obligations, none of which are aimed at
discussions of medical treatment options. Despite the lack of evi
dence that gag clauses existed, the controversy resulted in a public
outcry and a wave of state and federal legislation.105 Although Pro
fessor Hall takes great pains to state in this book that he is not
advocating, and does not support, gag clauses in physician con
tracts, a proposal that could restrict, or could be read as a justifica
tion for restricting, disclosures of medical information to managed
care patients is almost certain to result in more, and more intrusive,
regulation.
Disclosure of rationing decisions at the bedside will serve both
to avoid intrusive regulation and to moderate patients' expectations
and demands. Physician rationing that is invisible to the patient will
not accomplish patient or societal acceptance of a tole for physi
cians that no longer includes an absolute quality ethic. Hidden
cost-consciousness at the bedside continues the myth that patients,
their physicians, and society need not make hard choices. Neither
enrollees in managed care organizations nor those organizations are
well served by the failure of physicians to discuss the effect of cost
on their clinical decisions.

III.

CONCLUSION

I agree with Professor Hall that the absolute quality ethic is not
the right prescription for American medicine. Having disagreed
with his theory of economic informed consent, I offer the following.
First, patients must know in advance that their physicians have the
104. See General Accounting Office, Managed Care: Explicit Gag Clauses Not Found in
HMO Contracts, But Physician Concerns Remain, GAO/HEHS-97-175 (Aug. 29, 1997).
105. For a comprehensive discussion of gag clause legislation, see The Text of State HM0
Consumer Protection Provision (visited April 14, 1998) <http:l/www.familiesusa.org/
hmostat2.html#protections>. See also David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection and Managed
Care: With Friends Like These . . . , 43 VILL. L. REv. 409 (1998).
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discretion to withhold care for economic reasons. This conclusion is
consistent with and flows from, Professor Hall's analysis and can be
satisfied by properly formulated global disclosures at the time of
enrollment as he suggests (p. 143). Second, patient and physician at
the initiation of their relationship should engage in a substantive
discussion about a physician's values concerning the proper balance
between a patient's medical needs and the larger societal goals to
contain health care costs and ensure affordable health insurance.
This discussion is relevant to inform a patient's selection of a
caregiver and to enable a patient to find a physician whose values
most closely approximate her own. Here, too, Professor Hall and I
concur. Third, when a physician is making a decision to withhold
care that, but for the patient's enrollment in a health maintenance
organization she would recommend, the patient should be in
formed. In my view, global disclosures are necessary, but they are
not sufficient. Disclosing to patients sufficient information to per
mit them to participate meaningfully in the immediate treatment
decision fulfills the physician's fiduciary duty, respects patient au
tonomy, and maintains physician trustworthiness.
Although I was not fully convinced by Professor Hall's analysis,
and I was left with some significant questions at the book's end, this
is a compelling work. Professor Hall has opened the way for a
meaningful dialogue on the uses and limitations of physician bed
side rationing, ably laying the groundwork for further thought. This
book will surely spawn many "creative ideas" (p. 262). I commend
it to you.

